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C l u b G o o d I n f l u e n c e o n R e s i d e n t i a l
T r a n s a c t i o n P r i c e s
A u t h o r s J . Andrew Hansz and Darren K. Hayunga
A b s t r a c t We examine residential real estate transactions in a market where
an additional property right to a club good may have an influence
on prices. We find that for single-family property, the market
capitalizes approximately 50% of the full value of the extra
property right. For condominiums, the amount reduces to
approximately 25%. While these amounts are positive, they
clearly are significantly lower than full value.
Real estate is fundamentally a private good—the economic definition of a private
good being a good that is rivalrous and excludable. Rival goods are those whose
consumption by one party prevents simultaneous consumption by a different party.
An excludable good or service prevents people who have not paid for it from
enjoying the benefit. At least in the United States, the orthodoxy of real estate
ownership is the owner’s rights of exclusive possession, use, and disposition of
real property.
Despite the inherent private good nature of real estate, there are some instances
when additional rights and responsibilities attach to real property such that the
private good includes club good features. In comparison to private goods, club
goods maintain excludability but are non-rivalrous. That is, multiple parties can
consume the club benefits but are only able to do so based upon entrance into the
club. General club good examples include NATO and cable television, as well as
social and religious organizations.
Instances of real estate club goods include historically-designated property,
retirement and gated communities, and developments employing strict covenants
and restrictions. In these real estate examples, members adhere to restrictions or
requirements (e.g., age) to gain entrance into the club and accordingly enjoy the
benefits of membership. Do and Grudnitski (1997), Langbein and Spotswood-
Bright (2004), and Coulson and Lahr (2005) are example studies of club good
real estate.
We consider another traditional club good in this paper—the country club.
Specifically, we investigate real property ownership in the Village of Pinehurst,
North Carolina. The area was developed by and around the Pinehurst Resort and
Country Club (Pinehurst C.C.) and world-class golf courses.1 In addition to
5 5 0  H a n s z a n d H a y u n g a
offering a singular golf experience, Pinehurst C.C. has a membership structure
that makes for unique economic study (see Appendix A for background
information and current aspects of Pinehurst C.C.).
To join Pinehurst C.C., prospective members must own real estate within the
incorporated limits of the Village. Upon deciding to join Pinehurst C.C. and
purchase property within the Village, a prospective member faces another decision.
Dispersed throughout the Village are homes that hold an additional property right
that allows a member to pay a $12,000 transfer fee to join the country club.
Alternatively, if a prospect buys a home without the extra property right, they
must pay a $40,000 initiation fee to join. This $28,000 difference between the
two amounts is easily observable in the Pinehurst C.C. fee schedule.
Accordingly, our main research objective is to investigate the value the market
places on the additional property right; the answer being not entirely clear ex
ante.2 On the one hand, the $28,000 savings is public information and those
homebuyers that will subsequently join Pinehurst C.C. should bid up to this
amount for the additional right. On the other hand, there are traditional residential
purchasers who live in the Pinehurst community who do not desire to join the
country club but still desire to purchase a home in the Village. Clearly, the $28,000
savings is of little value as they will not realize it without joining the club.
Alternatively, there may be other property attributes that causes a homebuyer, who
does not intend to join Pinehurst C.C., to pay a property right premium (e.g., a
non-golfer valuing a golf view).3
These various scenarios suggest a quantitative analysis that isolates the value of
the additional right relative to the $28,000 savings. We are able to execute such
a test using both single-family residences and condominiums in Pinehurst Village.
We observe the shadow price of the additional property right is significantly less
than the $28,000 savings. For single-family transactions, the mean market value
of the club membership right ranges from approximately $14,000 to $18,000,
depending upon the model. Using condominium transactions, the property right
decreases in price ranging from $6,000 to $9,800.
We also examine characteristics of the residences that hold the property right
versus those that do not in a probit model. The single-family results demonstrate
that properties with the additional right spend less time on the market, are more
concentrated in certain parts of the Village, and possess a few structural differences
such as number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and garage spaces. Conversely, we find
that condominium transactions between the two types of properties do not exhibit
any differences with the exception of the number of bedrooms—somewhat
surprisingly, condominiums with the property right have fewer bedrooms. One
rationale for this last finding is that out-of-town owners, who are plentiful in
Pinehurst as compared to other residential markets, prefer a smaller vacation home
with less upkeep (common in other resort housing markets).
Overall, this study adds to the real estate literature with respect to the valuation
of a club good right associated with real property ownership. Moreover, the study
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offers a unique natural experiment where we can observe the actual versus implicit
price of a unique property right.
 C l u b G o o d s a n d P i n e h u r s t C . C .
Due at least to uniqueness, we describe the Pinehurst market with respect to club
goods in this section. We also provide a general overview of club good theory in
Appendix B. Seminal articles in this area include Buchanan (1965) and Olson
(1965). Cornes and Sandler (1996) provide valuable background.
In addition to the aforementioned non-rivalrous and exclusionary characteristics,
club goods also (1) exhibit a distinction between members and nonmembers of
the club, (2) involve voluntary membership, (3) require an exclusion mechanism,
and (4) are adverse to crowding, which leads to finite membership. As an oft-
mentioned example of a club good, a private country club is a quintessential club
good and Pinehurst C.C. possesses all these attributes.
Pinehurst C.C. can be further defined as a variable-utilization, mixed-membership
club good. Unlike fixed-utilization clubs where all members utilize the entire
supply of the shared good, Pinehurst C.C. members use varying services within
the club. Similarly, clubs can also be categorized based upon their membership
composition. Pinehurst C.C. is a mixed-membership club as each member
purchases the type of membership they prefer (e.g., golf, tennis, or social) and
are not one homogeneous member set.
Further refinement is found in the exclusivity method, which Helsley and Strange
(1991) define as a fine exclusion mechanism. Fine exclusion simply means
charging a member both an entrance fee and a per-use cost. While Pinehurst C.C.
charges both fees and varies the per-use price based upon members self-selecting
their own expected use, we specifically examine the entrance fee value.
In contrast to the Pinehurst C.C., the traditional country club model generally uses
a fine exclusion mechanism but admits most prospects who have had their
application and entrance fee accepted (i.e., the exclusion mechanism is not
dependent upon a specific real property right). In some instances the acceptance
is dependent upon living within close proximity to the country club (e.g.,
metropolitan area or county); however, the geographical requirement is not always
required.4
At the other end of the country club spectrum is the real estate development that
creates a private residential community centered around golf, tennis, or a specific
lifestyle (e.g., retirement). Unlike the mixed-membership of Pinehurst C.C.,
prospects who desire to live in these, often gated, communities do so with the
understanding that the purchase of real property within the community includes
privileges to all the amenities. Thus, in these homogeneous clubs, there is no
distinction between levels of service and, in many instances, the entrance fee is
the purchase of the real property within the development.5
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Pinehurst C.C. is unlike either of the more traditional club goods that include a
golf, tennis, and country club experience due to the bifurcated entrance fee
structure. Whereas the entrance fee to the traditional country club is generally a
singular amount, admittance into Pinehurst C.C. is based upon possession of the
established membership right (EMR). And whereas private residential
communities are homogeneous with regard to utilization and membership,
Pinehurst C.C. club good is mixed-membership and variable-utilization.
 E m p i r i c a l A n a l y s i s
We investigate the value of the EMR using both single-family residences and
condominiums. The single-family sample is 1,051 transactions in Pinehurst
Village from 2002 to 2004. Exhibit 1 details the location of the single-family
observations. For the same period, the condominium sample is 206 transactions.
These samples constitute almost all multiple listing service (MLS) transactions
during the three-year period with the loss of only a few records due to missing
fields and data entry errors.
S i n g l e - F a m i l y R e s i d e n c e s
Exhibit 2 provides descriptive statistics of the single-family transactions. The main
variable of interest, EMR, is a dichotomous variable taking a value of one if the
transaction includes an established membership right and zero otherwise; 544
properties (52%) hold the EMR.
Many of the covariates are typical determinants of residential real property prices.6
These include the age of the residence, size (measured by square feet, number of
bedrooms, and number of bathrooms), the number of garage and/or carport spaces,
and the home style (i.e., ranch, contemporary, cottage, and other).
We also estimate buyer and seller characteristics. We model the type of financing
used by the buyer—cash, conventional, government, and other—to account for
possible cash discounts as in Lusht and Hansz (1992). Based on Colwell and
Munneke (2006), we control for varying slope coefficients on seller types, which
for the single-family sample are individuals, builders, estates, lenders, and
investors.
Another seller-specific attribute is the amount of time a property spends on the
market (TOM). We follow two strategies for TOM. Our first approach follows
Knight (2002) and Harding, Knight, and Sirmans (2003) by computing TOM using
two-stage least squares (2SLS). Consistent with search theory, homes with unusual
characteristics will generally be on the market longer. Accordingly, our first stage
uses TOM as the dependent variable and as the explanatory variables both large
and small extreme values of building age, square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms,
as well as the Pinehurst submarkets, since unique properties might cluster in one
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Exhibi t 1  Single-Family Observations
section of the Village. The residuals are subsequently used in the hedonic models
reported.
A second approach is to separate TOM into bands to account for possible
nonlinearity.7 We split the sample into bands based upon subsamples that hold
enough observations to provide power. We code each observation equal to one
(zero otherwise) when the TOM fits into one of the following bands: 1–60, 61–
90, 91–120, 121–180, and 181–745 days.
We also investigate for any price difference when the purchase involves an out-
of-town buyer. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) find that out-of-town
purchasers will pay a premium. To determine out-of-town owners, we match the
MLS sample with the Moore County tax records and code a dummy variable
equal to one if the property tax bill is sent to an address outside of the Pinehurst
area. By this proxy, Pinehurst has a substantial number of out-of-town owners—
54% of the sample of single-family structures. However, the proxy is noisy and
we do not find it significant in any of our models.
We control for explanatory variables that are unique to the Pinehurst Village. We
model for the section of the village through dichotomous variables—the center of
the village is area O with the remaining areas coded as A through D. We also use
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Exhibi t 2  Summary Statistics of Single-Family Residences
Variable Mean Median Min. Max.
Sales Price 250,193.59 200,000.00 53,000.00 1,375,000.00
EMR 0.52 1.00 0.00 1.00
Age of Residence 11.63 7.00 0.00 113.00
Square Feet 2,254.27 2,082.00 562.00 6,538.00
No. of Bedrooms 3.27 3.00 1.00 5.00
No. of Bathrooms 2.51 2.50 1.00 4.00
No. of Garage Spaces 1.86 2.00 0.00 3.00
No. of Carport Spaces 0.04 0.00 0.00 2.00
Submarket O 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket A 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket B 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket C 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket D 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00
Golf-Course View 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00
CCNC 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
Ranch Style 0.54 1.00 0.00 1.00
Contemporary Style 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cottage Style 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00
Other Styles 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cash 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conventional 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00
Government and Other 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
Individual Seller 0.71 1.00 0.00 1.00
Builder 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00
Estate 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00
Lender 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
Investor 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 157.75 134.00 1.00 745.00
TOM 1–60 days 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 61–90 days 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 91–120 days 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 121–180 days 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 181–745 days 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00
Vacant 0.54 1.00 0.00 1.00
Out-of-town 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00
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a dummy variable for the Country Club of North Carolina (CCNC) properties.
CCNC is an exclusive country club located within two miles of Pinehurst C.C. in
which a member must sponsor any prospective member. Homes in this section of
the Village are expected to command higher prices due to the prestige and
exclusivity of the CCNC.
Including CCNC, Pinehurst has more than ten golf courses within the immediate
areas. Accordingly, we add a control for a golf course view. Shultz and Schmitz
(2009) study residential housing prices in proximity to golf course locations and
find transaction price premiums. This price premium was strongest with private
equity courses (such as Pinehurst and CCNC), as compared to public and private
non-equity courses.
We define golf course proximity as having a golf course view. There is precedent
in the real estate literature regarding the positive pricing impacts of views on
residential transaction prices (Bond, Seiler, and Seiler 2002) and using the golf
course view is an important metric specific to Pinehurst for two reasons. The first
reason is to capture a potential premium for a picturesque and exclusive location.
In speaking with local brokers, proximity to a golf course is important to many
buyers and the term ‘‘golf course view’’ is commonly cited in marketing materials.
Additionally, golf course frontage is not used since abutting a golf course can be
a disadvantage due to foot traffic and privacy loss.
The other reason golf course view is an important determinant specific to the
Pinehurst market is due to the high concentration of golf courses. Previous golf
course studies (e.g., Do and Grudnitski, 1995) examine the value of abutting a
golf course. However, with more than ten golf courses dispersed throughout the
Village, proximity to a single course may not model a more complex relationship
among a variety of golf courses. Hence, golf course view provides the best proxy
for the aesthetical and locational aspects of the Pinehurst real estate market.
Least Squares Models. We begin modeling transaction prices using a specification
restricted to hedonic variables. Model 1 in Exhibit 3 details the least squares
regression results with Davidson-MacKinnon heteroscedasticity-consistent errors.
Meeting with our priors, many of the independent variables are significant. The
model yields an adjusted R2 of 0.83. Note that we include monthly fixed effects
to capture any changes in the market due to the month of sale.
The parameter estimate on EMR in Model 1 is 0.09. We use Kennedy (1981) for
proper estimation of a quantitative variable in a semi-log equation. Given the
average sales price of approximately $250,000 for single-family residences, the
coefficient equates to a mean premium of $21,048.
The other covariates meet with our expectations. Age of the residence is negative,
with the quadratic demonstrating a reduction in the negative relation between age
and transaction price as age increases. Square feet is positive as is the number of
bedrooms and garage spaces. We note that bedrooms is negative, which we
confirm is a due to square feet and number of bedrooms—both potential proxies
for size—in the same specification.8
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Exhibi t 3  Single-Family Transaction Prices using Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 11.43 11.87 11.42
(129.49)*** (56.54)*** (121.16)***
EMR 0.09 0.08 0.08
(5.59)*** (4.78)*** (5.18)***
Age of Residence 0.01 0.01 0.01
(6.87)*** (6.56)*** (6.14)***
Age2 (*103) 0.12 0.12 0.12
(6.40)*** (6.72)*** (6.18)***
Square Feet (*103) 0.36 0.38 0.36
(15.42)*** (17.56)*** (16.92)***
No. of Bedrooms 0.06 0.05 0.05
(3.08)*** (2.73)*** (2.28)***
No. of Baths 0.11 0.12 0.10
(4.89)*** (4.77)*** (4.43)***
No. of Garage Spaces 0.06 0.05 0.06
(2.59)*** (2.45)** (2.64)***
No. of Carport Spaces 0.05 0.06 0.06
(1.08) (1.23) (1.19)
Submarket O 0.36 0.30 0.35
(6.03)*** (4.67)*** (6.13)***
Submarket A 0.02 0.10 0.01
(1.28) (2.10)** (0.60)
Submarket B 0.03 0.04 0.03
(1.34) (1.72)* (1.47)
Submarket D 0.16 0.30 0.15
(9.35)*** (4.35)*** (8.58)***
Golf-Course View 0.15 0.15 0.15
(6.06)*** (6.11)*** (6.11)***
CCNC 0.27 0.22 0.23
(4.59)*** (4.07)*** (4.17)***
Ranch Style 0.06 0.05 0.05
(3.51)*** (2.65)*** (2.84)***
Contemporary Style 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.31) (0.32) (0.17)
Other Styles 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.99) (1.03) (0.85)
Cash 0.04 0.04
(2.42)** (2.09)**
Gov. 0.01 0.00
(0.29) (0.09)
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Exhibi t 3  (continued)
Single-Family Transaction Prices using Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
Out-of-town 0.02 0.02
(1.35) (1.64)
TOM (*102) 0.26
(2.09)**
TOM 1–60 days 0.00
(0.12)
TOM 61–90 days 0.03
(1.43)
TOM 91–120 days 0.00
(0.17)
TOM 121–180 days 0.01
(0.71)
Vacant 0.09 0.10
(5.79)*** (5.85)***
Builder 0.06 0.04
(3.08)*** (2.44)**
Estate 0.11 0.10
(2.60)*** (2.53)**
Other Seller Type 0.02 0.01
(0.80) (0.44)
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.83 0.85 0.84
Notes: The exhibit presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of independent variables
potentially correlated with Pinehurst single-family property transactions. All models use
heteroscedasticity-consistent errors. For Model 1, N  1,051; for Models 2 and 3, N  998.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
In Model 2 in Exhibit 3, we add the buyer and seller characteristics. With the
inclusion of the additional covariates, the EMR is 0.08, which equates to an
average premium $17,468. There is no change in the sign or magnitude of any of
the property-specific controls. We note that despite the degrees of freedom loss
by adding the agent characteristics, the adjusted R2 increases to 0.85 in Model 2.
Regarding the agent characteristics, we find vacant properties experience a mean
decrease of 0.09. Further, the results demonstrate that when a builder is the selling
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party, transaction prices increase by 0.06. This is in contrast to estate sales with
an observed decrease of 0.11.
We next examine the similar specification using the agent characteristics with the
only change being to use banded TOM. Model 3 in Exhibit 3 presents the results.
The change in TOM neither alters the coefficients nor the conclusions as all of
the explanatory variables maintain their signs and significances. The EMR in
Model 3 equates to a premium of $19,355.
Spatial Autoregressive Models. Since all of the observations are located within the
Village of Pinehurst and within five miles from one another, we next investigate
transaction prices and the EMR value using a spatial autoregressive (SAR)
specification (see Appendix C for SAR details). Because real property assets
possess a geographical signature, the error term using least squares may not be
consistent, which may bias coefficient estimates. Consequently, we control for this
effect by determining a spatial-weight matrix and including a spatial dependence
term in the specification. Exhibit 4 provides the results of three models that control
for spatial dependence.
In Model 1 in Exhibit 4, we include the spatial term with the property-specific
attributes. We observe a modest reduction in the EMR to 0.07, which equals an
approximate dollar value of $17,375. The other determinants of transaction prices
are the same as the least squares model. Note that the transaction prices display
spatial dependence with the value of  being more than eight standard errors from
zero.
The one notable change is in the result of the Submarket B in Exhibit 4. Compared
to the least squares results in Exhibit 3, Submarket O still commands a sizable
price premium relative to the comparison submarket, which we choose as
Submarket C. Submarket A and Submarket D maintain their respective
significance. Alternatively, the Submarket B coefficient, which is insignificant in
Exhibit 3, is positive and significant in the SAR specification.
As in the least squares analysis, we next add agent characteristics to the
specification. In Model 2 of Exhibit 4, we use 2SLS to control for endogenous
TOM while in Model 3 we use the banded TOM. The difference in TOM treatment
does not alter the other coefficients or overall conclusions. Concerning the main
variable of interest, we find the EMR in Model 2 equates to a premium of $14,189.
Similarly, the premium in Model 3 is $15,782.
In sum, the EMR coefficients demonstrate that the Pinehurst real estate market
does value properties with the active club membership status, but not to the full
extent of the $28,000 cost savings. The values range between a low of $14,189
and a high of $21,048. We posit that the low of $14,189 is closer to the true
average premium as Model 2 in Exhibit 4 is unrestricted and it controls for spatial
dependence, agent characteristics, and TOM endogeneity.
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Exhibi t 4  Single-Family Transaction Prices using SAR
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 11.54 11.90 11.48
(59.36)*** (46.67)*** (57.89)***
EMR 0.07 0.06 0.07
(4.84)*** (4.17)*** (4.54)***
Age of Residence 0.01 0.01 0.01
(8.86)*** (8.63)*** (8.08)
Age2 (*103) 0.12 0.13 0.12
(8.79)*** (8.94)*** (8.35)***
Square Feet (*103) 0.32 0.33 0.32
(19.92)*** (20.62)*** (20.38)***
No. of Bedrooms 0.06 0.05 0.04
(4.16)*** (3.45)*** (2.99)***
No. of Baths 0.12 0.12 0.11
(7.09)*** (7.21)*** (6.51)***
No. of Garage Spaces 0.06 0.06 0.06
(4.13)*** (4.05)*** (4.39)***
No. of Carport Spaces 0.04 0.06 0.06
(1.67)* (2.20)** (2.22)***
Submarket O 0.41 0.33 0.38
(8.94)*** (7.23)*** (8.29)***
Submarket A 0.01 0.06 0.01
(0.04) (1.73)* (0.38)
Submarket B 0.08 0.08 0.08
(2.19)** (2.43)** (2.33)**
Submarket D 0.17 0.29 0.16
(4.91)*** (5.85)*** (4.67)***
Golf-Course View 0.15 0.15 0.15
(7.50)*** (7.62)*** (7.58)***
CCNC 0.34 0.25 0.26
(7.23)*** (5.56)*** (5.69)***
Ranch Style 0.06 0.05 0.05
(3.74)*** (3.08)*** (3.13)***
Contemporary Style 0.03 0.01 0.01
(1.24) (0.41) (0.46)
Other Styles 0.03 0.02 0.02
(1.22) (1.12) (1.10)
Cash 0.03 0.03
(2.27)** (2.05)**
Gov 0.00 0.00
(0.12) (0.17)
5 6 0  H a n s z a n d H a y u n g a
Exhibi t 4  (continued)
Single-Family Transaction Prices using SAR
(1) (2) (3)
Out-of-town 0.01 0.02
(1.17) (1.52)
TOM (*102) 0.23
(3.63)***
TOM 1–60 days 0.01
(0.54)
TOM 61–90 days 0.04
(2.04)**
TOM 91–120 days 0.02
(0.73)
TOM 121–180 days 0.02
(0.94)
Vacant 0.09 0.09
(6.53)*** (6.87)***
Builder 0.06 0.05
(3.04)*** (2.29)**
Estate 0.10 0.09
(2.82)*** (2.68)***
Other Seller Type 0.02 0.01
(0.90) (0.49)
 0.47 0.46 0.47
(8.74)*** (8.10)*** (8.22)***
Monthly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The exhibit presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using a spatial
autoregressive model. For Model 1, N  1,051, log-likelihood  1,958.25; for Model 2,
N  998, log-likelihood  1,770.74; for Model 3, N  998, log-likelihood  1,776.53.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
C o n d o m i n i u m s
The entrance fee savings of $28,000 is not exclusive to single-family property. A
potentially more economical method for joining the Pinehurst C.C. is to obtain
the EMR by purchasing a condominium since the entrance fee savings is the same
but the real property costs can be lower with a condo. Thus, we examine
transaction prices for 206 condominiums over the same sample period, 2002 to
2004. Exhibit 5 shows the location of each observation.
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Exhibi t 5  Condominium Observations
We use many of the same covariates as in the single-family residence
specifications. Exhibit 6 details summary statistics of the model variables. In
contrast to single-family homes, we note (1) the average age of sold condos is
twice that of single-family residence (median condo age is four times the single-
family age), (2) a greater concentration of condos with the EMR in Submarket A,
and (3) a higher ratio of condo buyers paying cash. Somewhat unique in the
Pinehurst market, vacant properties comprise 60% of the condo sample, which is
similar to the 54% of the single-family resident sample. A justification for this
increased percentage is the fact that Pinehurst is a vacation/golf/ tourist town and
sellers may have a greater propensity to be selling a second home that is vacant
at the time of sale.
Least Squares Models. We model the natural logarithm of condo transaction prices
using the independent variables in Exhibit 6. Exhibit 7 details the results of three
specifications. Column 1 of Exhibit 7 presents the property-specific predictors. We
observe that the slopes on EMR, square feet, number of bathrooms, and three
submarkets are determinants. The adjusted R2 is 0.76.
t.>-• 
-
.! 
! 
. 
, .. 
J 
I 
.. 
...... -
.... .., 
.. 
I!] 
""· ... 
.. 
.. 
I • I 
f ... 
5 6 2  H a n s z a n d H a y u n g a
Exhibi t 6  Pinehurst Condominium Summary Statistics
Mean Median Min. Max.
Sales Price 128,086.00 125,000.00 49,000.00 380,000.00
EMR 0.63 1.00 0.00 1.00
Age of Residence 24.47 29.00 0.00 31.00
Square Feet 1,302.12 1,200.00 612.00 3,200.00
Number of Bedrooms 2.16 2.00 1.00 4.00
Number of Bathrooms 1.91 2.00 1.00 3.00
No. of Garage Spaces 0.41 0.00 0.00 2.00
No. of Carport Spaces 0.09 0.00 0.00 2.00
Submarket O 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket A 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket B 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket C 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00
Submarket D 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cash 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Conventional 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Government and Other 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
Individual Seller 0.91 1.00 0.00 1.00
Estate 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
Investor 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 158.63 118.50 1.00 1,081.00
TOM 1–60 days 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 61–90 days 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 91–120 days 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 121–180 days 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 181–365 days 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00
TOM 366–1,081 days 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00
Owner-occupied 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00
Tenant-occupied 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
Vacant 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00
The coefficient of EMR is roughly the same magnitude as the single-family
residence sample; however, since the mean transaction price of condominiums is
about half that of single-family homes, the EMR dollar value is materially less.
The coefficient of 0.09 equates to a dollar amount of $9,637.
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Exhibi t 7  Condominium Results using Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 10.41 10.88 10.47
(48.05)*** (44.97)*** (48.61)***
EMR 0.09 0.09 0.08
(2.69)*** (2.70)*** (2.44)**
Age of Residence 0.01 0.01 0.02
(1.29) (0.57) (1.37)
Age2 (*103) 0.39 0.14 0.42
(1.56) (0.51) (1.60)
Square Feet (*103) 0.24 0.33 0.23
(3.95)*** (4.73)*** (3.57)***
No. of Bedrooms 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.68) (0.44) (0.81)
No. of Baths 0.38 0.44 0.39
(6.45)*** (7.20)*** (6.39)***
No. of Garage Spaces 0.04 0.04 0.03
(1.40) (1.31) (1.11)
No. of Carport Spaces 0.04 0.06 0.04
(0.64) (0.89) (0.69)
Submarket O 0.64 0.65 0.66
(5.29)*** (5.44)*** (5.38)***
Submarket A 0.07 0.12 0.06
(1.17) (1.99)** (1.13)**
Submarket B 0.17 0.27 0.19
(2.76)*** (4.24)*** (3.14)***
Submarket D 0.18 0.41 0.23
(2.02)** (3.59)*** (2.38)***
Cash 0.01 0.02
(0.30) (0.58)
Gov. 0.14 0.11
(1.00) (0.77)
TOM (*102) 0.32
(3.24)***
TOM 1–60 days 0.11
(1.55)
TOM 61–90 days 0.04
(0.59)
TOM 91–120 days 0.09
(1.33)
TOM 121–180 days 0.09
(1.39)
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Exhibi t 7  (continued)
Condominium Results using Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
TOM 181–365 days 0.01
(0.14)
Tenant-occupied 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.14)
Vacant 0.08 0.08
(2.17)** (2.25)**
Builder 0.03 0.17
(0.24) (0.24)
Estate 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.12)
Investor 0.13 0.15
(1.56) (1.80)*
Monthly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The exhibit presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for predictors of Pinehurst
condominium transaction prices. All models use least squares regression with heteroscedasticity-
consistent errors. For Model 1, N  206, Adj. R2  0.76; for Model 2, N  206, Adj. R2 
0.78; for Model 3, N  206, Adj. R2  0.78.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
In Model 2 of Exhibit 7 we include the agent characteristics. The EMR maintains
the same coefficient (rounded) and a similar standard error. Consequently, the
EMR value is a comparable $9,522.
When employing banded TOM in Model 3 in Exhibit 7, we find the same adjusted
R2 as Model 2 (0.78%) but the EMR reduces to 0.08 or a value of $8,607. While
the EMR values in Exhibit 7 are positive premiums, they are certainly different
than the $28,000 potential savings.
Spatial Autoregressive Models. We also examine the condo market using the SAR
specification. Exhibit 8 details the three models. We find the unrestricted Model
2 to be the best fit given the value of the log-likelihood function. Further, given
the close proximity of the properties, Model 2 finds statistical significant slope on
the spatial dependence parameter.
In all three Models in Exhibit 8, we observe a reduced value of the EMR. For
Model 2, the mean dollar amount is $6,615. This amount is less than value in the
least squares specifications that do not account for spatial dependence.
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Exhibi t 8  Condominium Results using SAR
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 10.48 10.95 10.49
(23.77)*** (23.41)*** (23.89)***
EMR 0.08 0.07 0.07
(2.56)*** (2.06)** (1.81)*
Age of Residence 0.01 0.01 0.02
(1.49) (0.76) (1.78)**
Age2 (*103) 0.36 0.09 0.41
(1.64) (0.36) (1.93)**
Square Feet (*103) 0.25 0.38 0.26
(4.49)*** (5.46)*** (4.18)***
No. of Bedrooms 0.01 0.05 0.01
(0.35) (1.00) (0.01)
No. of Baths 0.39 0.46 0.40
(6.96)*** (7.71)*** (6.90)***
No. of Garage Spaces 0.04 0.04 0.03
(1.62) (1.48) (1.21)
No. of Carport Spaces 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.57) (0.65) (0.54)
Submarket O 0.64 0.60 0.66
(4.55)*** (3.66)*** (4.38)***
Submarket A 0.06 0.08 0.05
(1.06) (1.05) (0.69)
Submarket B 0.18 0.33 0.24
(2.88)*** (4.51)*** (3.62)***
Submarket D 0.17 0.45 0.26
(1.72)* (4.02)*** (2.64)***
Cash 0.01 0.01
(0.30) (0.25)
Gov. 0.14 0.05
(1.00) (0.53)
TOM (*102) 0.33
(3.92)***
TOM 1–60 days 0.12
(1.90)*
TOM 61–90 days 0.08
(1.17)
TOM 91–120 days 0.08
(1.52)
TOM 121–180 days 0.10
(1.75)*
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Exhibi t 8  (continued)
Condominium Results using SAR
(1) (2) (3)
TOM 181–365 days 0.00
(0.00)
Tenant-occupied 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.09)
Vacant 0.08 0.07
(2.17)** (2.34)**
Builder 0.01 0.16
(0.02) (0.81)
Estate 0.03 0.01
(0.37) (0.10)
Investor 0.19 0.22
(2.36)** (2.33)**
 0.30 0.52 0.48
(1.35) (2.38)*** (1.58)
Monthly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The exhibit presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of predictors of Pinehurst,
N.C. condominium transaction prices using a spatial autoregressive model. For Model 1, N 
206, log-likelihood  177.57; for Model 2, N  206, log-likelihood  163.44; for Model 3,
N  206, log-likelihood  163.94.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
EM R D e t e r m i n a n t s
Overall, the market recognizes an increase in transaction prices for the private
membership right in both single-family and condominium markets, ceteris paribus.
And while all the models regressing transaction prices explain a high proportion
of transaction price variability, we question whether there are any specific
characteristics associated with EMR holding properties beyond price. We
investigate this through a probit model with the EMR as the dependent variable
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. We use the unrestricted specification that includes
agent characteristics for both the single-family and condominium markets. Exhibit
9 details the findings for converging variables.
We observe a number of significant independent variables in the single-family
market. Of course, the natural logarithm of transaction price is significant given
the $28,000 potential savings. The findings also suggest that an older home with
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Exhibi t 9  Probit Results
Single-Family Condominiums
Intercept 9.46 18.92
(4.01)*** (3.42)***
Log Price 1.09 1.53
(5.29)*** (2.96)***
Age 0.02 0.06
(3.42)*** (0.85)
Age2 0.00
(0.85)
No. of Bedrooms 0.23 0.66
(2.22)** (2.58)***
No. of Baths 0.44 0.44
(3.30)*** (0.98)
No. of Garage Spaces 0.29 0.17
(2.18)** (0.86)
No. of Carport Spaces 0.24 0.33
(1.12) (0.82)
Submarket O 1.77 0.31
(5.46)*** (0.34)
Submarket A 0.35 0.54
(1.45) (1.36)
Submarket B 0.47 0.35
(2.74)*** (0.86)
Submarket D 2.16
(5.81)***
Golf View 0.48
(2.79)***
CCNC 2.62
(7.55)***
Ranch 0.09
(0.64)
Contemporary 0.13
(0.72)
Other Styles 0.14
(0.78)
Month 0.02 0.01
(3.69)*** (1.16)
Cash 0.08 0.32
(0.72) (1.57)
Gov. 0.10 0.17
(0.47) (0.17)
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Exhibi t 9  (continued)
Probit Results
Single-Family Condominiums
Out-of-town 0.12
(1.25)
TOM 0.03 0.00
(4.05)*** (0.39)
Vacant 0.00 0.48
(0.01) (1.94)*
Tenant-occupied 0.71
(1.91)*
Builder 0.26
(1.67)*
Estate 0.15 0.35
(0.53) (0.77)
Investor 0.33
(0.54)
Other Seller Type 0.14
(0.64)
Notes: The exhibit presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the probability of a
property holding the Established Membership property right. For Model 1, N  998, log-
likelihood  471.02, McFadden’s LRI  0.31; for Model 2, N  206, log-likelihood 
104.75, McFadden’s LRI  0.23.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
more bathrooms but fewer bedrooms has a significant effect on the probability of
owning an EMR holding property. Location is another significant determinant
relative to the control area, Submarket C. A golf course view also increases the
propensity of owning an EMR holding property, which meets with our priors since
homebuyers who desire the EMR as a means to reduce the country club entrance
fee are drawn to golf and should value golf course views.
Note that the TOM variable is negative and significant. This suggests that
residential properties on the market for a shorter time have a greater probability
of possessing the EMR characteristic and it appears that the EMR features helps
properties sell relatively quicker.
The number of significant variables in the single-family model is in contrast to
the condominium transactions. Besides the expected difference in transaction
price, the main determinant is the number of bedrooms and, to a lesser extent, the
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parameter estimates on vacant and tenant-occupied condominiums, with a
marginally significant p-value of 0.06. The overall lack of important determinants
suggests that the more uniform Pinehurst condominium market does not discern
a great difference between EMR holding and non-EMR holding properties, all
else equal.
 C o n c l u s i o n
This study examines a club good feature attached to real property in the Village
of Pinehurst, North Carolina. The Pinehurst C.C. offers a bifurcated entrance fee
based on ownership of a Pinehurst residence with an additional property right.
Homes with the right pay an ‘‘Established Membership’’ transfer fee of $12,000
to join Pinehurst C.C. Alternatively, prospects that want to become a member but
purchase property without an established membership must pay a $40,000
initiation fee with their application for membership.
The property right, thus, has a potential value of $28,000. However, it is not
entirely clear the value the Pinehurst market places on the property right. For
example, Pinehurst C.C. prospective members should bid up to the full amount
but others buyers who do not value the country club membership but still bid for
EMR properties for other attributes of the differentiated residential real estate
product.
We model both the Pinehurst single-family and condominium residential markets.
Using the most comprehensive models, the results demonstrate an EMR valuation
of approximately $14,000 for single-family residences and $6,500 for
condominiums. While these amounts are positive, they are lower than the potential
$28,000 savings.
We received some suggestions from an anonymous referee as to why the property
right may be discounted. One thought is that Pinehurst is a relatively ‘‘thin’’ and
isolated real estate market with a steady but constrained buyer demand. In contrast,
a metropolitan area with a larger population base and greater market demand may
realize both higher property transaction prices and market capitalization of the
EMR closer to the $28,000. Further, our sample period from 2002 to 2004 follows
an increase in the construction of golf course development in the 1990s. Despite
Pinehurst being unique and somewhat isolated, the country club is subject to
competition, especially considering the 30 plus golf courses located within a 15-
mile drive.
We have surveyed the Pinehurst area golf course and contacted the Pinehurst
membership office concerning competition. To the referee’s point, substantial golf
course development occurred around Pinehurst in the late 1980s and though the
1990s. In 1988, Beacon Ridge Golf & Country Club and National Golf Course
added 18-hole courses each. In the 1990s, a total of four new 18-hole courses
were developed in Pinehurst.
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While Pinehurst golf course development had increased since the 1970s, the
Pinehurst membership office reports generally slow but steady membership growth
since the 1980s. The supply of golf courses and the subsequent supply of
residential housing surrounding these courses could have an impact on the market
clearing price for residential homes and the extra property right.
 E n d n o t e s
1 The famed No. 2 course was the site of the 1999 and 2005 U.S. Open Championship.
Legendary golfer Bobby Jones referred to Pinehurst C.C. as the ‘‘St. Andrews of United
States Golf.’’
2 Similar to studies such as Allen (1997), Guntermann and Moon (2002), and Lin, Liu,
and Yao (2010), who studied age-restrictive covenants, we expect a price premium in
this study. It is the realized versus the observable values that we are particularly interested
in.
3 A possible scenario is a purchaser who does not join the country club but purchases a
home with the active club membership as an investment if the present value of the
property right cost is less than the present value of the property right benefit (i.e.,
$28,000) discounted back to the present given the buyer’s specific discount rate. However,
Pinehurst C.C. requires a monthly per-use fee to keep a membership active, which will
result in a negative NPV project based upon any reasonable holding period and discount
rate.
4 Some country clubs will allow non-residents to join with reduced benefits such as no
voting rights or at a higher initial cost. Many traditional country clubs are privately owned
by the members or a private corporation and membership includes voting rights related
to the management of the club.
5 Of course, a real estate developer or private residential community can use any mix of
variable utilization, mixed membership, and fee exclusion, and examples can be found
of such.
6 For a meta-analysis of residential hedonic variable values, see Simons and Saginor
(2006).
7 We credit an anonymous referee for recommending this alternative approach.
8 We calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all least squares specifications in the
study. We find all VIFs are less than 3; hence, based upon a typical standard of VIFs
needing to be less than 5, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem.
 A p p e n d i x A
 P i n e h u r s t C o u n t y C l u b
Bostonian entrepreneur James Walker Tufts founded the Village of Pinehurst,
North Carolina in 1891. Tufts initially built a small hotel, a store, several boarding
houses, and 16 small cottages. Subsequently, he commissioned Frederick Law
Olmsted, most know for his creation of Central Park in New York City, to plan
his future village in North Carolina. Olmsted fashioned a Village Green (located
in Submarket O in our study) in an oval shape with winding roads.
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Tufts then hired Dr. D. Leroy Culver of New York to design and build a golf
course in Pinehurst, and in February of 1898 a nine-hole course was constructed.
The first clubhouse followed a few months later. In 1899, Pinehurst’s first golf
professional, John Dunn Tucker, was hired to add an additional nine, which later
became Pinehurst No. 1, the first 18-hole layout.
In 1900, Tufts hired Donald Ross, a native of Scotland, who had just completed
his apprenticeship at St. Andrews, to come to Pinehurst. Bringing young Ross to
America would profoundly affect American golf. Ross designed over 600 golf
courses across the country. One of Ross’ greatest accomplishments can be said to
be the famed course Number 2 at Pinehurst—home of the 1999 and 2005 U.S.
Open and scheduled to host the 2014 U.S. Open.
Today, Pinehurst is one of several golf courses in Moore County, North Carolina.
The Moore county towns of Pinehurst, Aberdeen, and Southern Pines boast 43
golf courses within a 15-mile diameter. Despite the juxtaposition of the towns,
the various courses were developed, and are currently managed, by different firms.
Accordingly, there is no overlap in services. That is, the facilities in Aberdeen
and Southern Pines are generally for golf, whereas Pinehurst C.C. offers extended
amenities that contribute to interesting study of club good real estate.
 A p p e n d i x B
 G e n e r a l C l u b G o o d T h e o r y
The spectrum of economic goods ranges from private goods that exclude others
from enjoying the benefits of the good to public goods from which the benefits
are not excludable. Within this spectrum lies the club good, which is wholly
excludable but partially rival. Since the seminal papers by Olson (1965) and
Buchanan (1965), over 400 papers have addressed club goods. The text by Cornes
and Sandler (1996) provides an excellent discussion of the advances in club goods
theory. Additionally, they discuss the six characteristics that define club goods.
We examine these characteristics to define the good that is the Pinehurst C.C.
The first characteristic of a club good is that it is voluntary. The members choose
to belong to the club because their anticipated utility from membership benefits
along with any other companion goods is equal or greater than the utility received
from not joining the club. Additionally, the gain in utility must exceed the toll or
fees paid to belong to the club.
The second distinguishing feature is crowding and finite club membership. For a
public good, crowding costs are zero; hence, all comers are provided the public
good (e.g., public schools). Alternatively, for a club good, increased membership
into the club induces congestion. Club members derive utility from fewer service
interruptions, shorter travel times on highways, or a potential increase in the
quality of education due to smaller class sizes in the case of a private school.
Hence, club goods add the cost of crowding to offset the benefit of continuing to
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add more members and reducing per share costs of club goods. Overall, crowding
or congestion leads to a finite membership in club goods and the rivalrous nature
of the club good.
Conditional on finite membership, club goods are also characterized by
nonmembers. Since crowding is not an issue with a public good, there are no
nonmembers. Conversely, club goods require an exclusive group whereby
nonmembers are excluded. Subsequently, nonmembers have the choice to join
another club that provides the same club good or not join a club entirely.
The fourth characteristic is that club goods have some mechanism to provide
exclusivity. This may be in the form of, for example, a membership committee or
a tollbooth. The key points are that the exclusion mechanism must be operated at
a reasonable cost, and that the mechanism provides the incentive for members to
join. Without the mechanism, nonmembers could enjoy the club good benefits
and, consequently, members lose the incentive to join.
This leads to the fifth characteristic, which is that club goods involve two
allocation choices that need to be solved simultaneously. Membership size is of
major consideration to facilitators of club goods. Concurrently, the level of service
is determined based upon Samuelson’s (1954) provision condition for public
goods. The marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation of
the club good in the Buchanan (1965) model depend on the same variables and
must be solved simultaneously.
The paper by Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) describes the characteristics
mentioned thus far as the six distinguishing features. Cornes and Sandler (1996)
identify another component—optimality. Because club goods can be defined as a
subtype of public good and since club goods share the nonrivalrous nature of
public goods, one might think that government intervention is inevitable. However,
Cornes and Sandler (1996) point out that, since clubs can collect tolls through an
exclusion mechanism, clubs can obtain Pareto-optimal results without government
intervention.
We argue that Pinehurst C.C. fits well within these six characteristics. In addition
to being voluntary, Pinehurst C.C. has a finite number of members and there exist
a clear distinction between a member and a nonmember. Also, the initiation or
transfer fee, a membership-approval committee, and on-going fees are effective
exclusion mechanisms. Lastly, Pinehurst C.C. does not require nor has any
government entity desired to involve themselves in the business of the club.
Given that Pinehurst C.C. is a classic example of a club good, we can go further
in defining the type of club good. Since Pinehurst C.C. offers fine dining,
championship level golf courses, a tennis club, a 200-acre lake and marina, private
swimming pools, and a spa, the entire Pinehurst C.C. package is a multiproduct
club. Further, in addition to the initiation or transfer fee associated with one’s real
estate holding, Pinehurst C.C. has four different levels of membership with
associated monthly fees. For example, in 2007, Full Member status entitles
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members to use the Members Club, which offers special dining service along with
private parties, as well as no green fees for golf or court fees for tennis and lawn
sports. The monthly cost is $325. For $250, a Pinehurst C.C. member can be a
Tennis member, which entitles them to the Members Club, no court fees for tennis
and lawn sports, but 1/2 the full rate for green fees. The other two membership
levels are Recreational at $125 per month and Social at $80 monthly. Overall,
based on the different levels of utilization and membership composition, Pinehurst
C.C. can be classified economically as a mixed-membership, variable-utilization
club good.
Finally, with the combination of the initiation or transfer fee along with the
monthly cost, Pinehurst C.C. uses a fine exclusion mechanism. Helsley and
Strange (1991) define fine exclusion as charging a member both an initial fee and
a per use price. Within the Pinehurst C.C. setting the initial membership fee is
clear. The per-use price is derived from the higher cost for a Full Member versus
lower monthly costs for members that presumably self-select based upon their
expected use of the club good.
Overall, Pinehurst C.C. offers a unique test environment to examine a specific
club good. A large majority of the theoretical club good literature examines the
simpler case of a homogeneous (vs. mixed) membership with fixed (vs. variable
utilization), and one club good. Brueckner and Lee (1991), Sandler and Tschirhart
(1993), and Lipsman and Sandler (1996) are some exceptions in the literature that
examine multiproduct goods. We believe this is the first test of real property that
is (1) multiproduct, (2) mixed membership, (3) variable utilization, and (4) fine
exclusion mechanism.
 A p p e n d i x C
 S p a t i a l A u t o r e g r e s s i v e M o d e l
Consistent with the axiomatic importance of location in real estate, house prices
tend to be correlated across space. Further, the covariance between transaction
prices tends to persist even though researchers have used extensive hedonic
specifications that controls for numerous structural, site, locational, and quality
variables. Gillen, Thibodeau, and Wachter (2001) find that, despite using a hedonic
model accounting for over 70 characteristics, the model residuals still demonstrate
correlation across space. Fik, Ling, and Mulligan (2003) find that accessibility
indices and distant gradients do not fully account for the influence of absolute
location on the determination of housing prices. The effect of the spatial
autocorrelation is potentially biased parameter estimates using the least squares
method.
We control for the spatial correlation through the SAR specification. Anselin
(1988) provides a maximum likelihood method for estimating the parameters. The
model is:
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y Wy  X  
2  N(0,  I )n
where y is an (Nx1) vector of dependent values and X is an (Nxk) matrix consisting
of all the explanatory variables in the standard model. The  parameters capture
the shadow prices of the independent covariates. Wy captures the spatial
correlation. W is the spatial weights matrix that controls for spatial contiguity
between the home sales. We construct W using Delaunay triangulation. It is not
entirely obvious how to divide a two-dimensional plane into regions. We use
Delaunay triangulation because it produces a slightly denser but more
heterogeneous weights matrix, which is more sensitive to clusters of locations in
close proximity. Moreover, Sibson (1978) shows that Delaunay triangulation
uniquely achieves the Lawson criteria (Ripley, 2004). The parameter  is the
coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable Wy.
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